编者按：针对2023年以来一些外洋主流媒体对中央聚积长入相似金融使命战略导向的误读，11月27日，中国东谈主民大学重阳金融筹谋院筹谋员李珊珊在香港《南华早报》发表评述著述，分析了在中国现时国情下党中央对金融使命聚积长入相似的必要性、影响及效劳。现将著述中英文版发布如下：

本文11月27日刊发在香港《南华早报》

2017年举行的中国第五次寰球金融使命会议初度强调“要坚执党中央对金融使命聚积长入相似”。2023年的中央金融使命会议进一步指出，“加强党中央对金融使命的聚积长入相似，是作念好金融使命的根蒂保证。”

2023年以来，中国的金融监管检阅动向在主流外洋媒体激励了等闲探究。有不雅点合计，加强聚积监管和强调金融业的政事性，和会过对本钱和信贷确立的搅扰加大金融不表示，因为如果市集参与者王人遵掷中央认同的行径模式弃取长入动掸，可能加大顺周期性风险，催生泡沫。还有不雅点合计，中国仍是明确将金融体系的功能定位为公用作事，而非市集导向的生意机构。

这些不雅点固然提供了一些重视洞见，但由于穷困对这一监管理念背后复杂国情的久了交融，并不全面客不雅。

“聚积长入相似”的监管本领深深植根于中国特有的治理架构。“准财政联邦”是中国政府的基本治理架构，对中国模式的交融必须置于这一治理框架下。中国式“准财政联邦”并非信得过的联邦制，而是政事集权与财政半均权的聚首。中国场所政府在场所经济有谋略中具有较大自主权，但又莫得停业机制。许多场所金融机构的实控东谈主又有场所政府布景，与场所政府有着缜密关系，增多了金融业治理的复杂性。连年来中国政府一直竭力于优化央地权利结构，裁减误解市集行径的政府隐性担保。关系词，鉴于中国广博的经济体量，不平衡的区域发展形式和日益复杂的国表里环境，这一检资格程势必是渐进的。

这一治理模式在金融范围导致的中枢问题是风险分管的永诀称性。在一个理思的公司治理架构中，股东承担首要风险，同期取得相匹配的申诉，是企业价值高潮的最大潜在受益者。而在中国的这一治理架构下，中央政府是金融风险和金融表示职守的最终承担者，收益和风险严重永诀等，场所政府和金融机构枯竭饱和的动机管控金融风险，进而决定了中国金融业昭着的政事性特征。

事实上，权责一致原则一直位于中国检阅议程的中枢，财政均权订恰是检阅绽开以来补助经济活力，杀青执续高增长的要紧运行之一早已成为政界和学界共鸣。金融范围的执续检阅同样带来了金融监管、风险管理、金融科技变调才智的显贵补助，但在这一历程中，提醒亦然相当惨重的。中国夙昔二十多年的金融检阅在摸索中严慎前行，主如果学习西方推崇国度，尤其是好意思国模式，并聚首本身国情进行了一定的优化调治。尽管中国金融监管机构在这一程度中勉力扬长避短，并努力平衡市集和监管的关系，在监管见地体系的构建上奏效尤为超过，但由于国度治理模式的特殊性，无前例可循，仍未幸免金融治理薄弱、监管不及、监管盲点和场所政府财政软管理等问题，导致连年来靡烂案件摄人心魄，场所债务风险加大，中小金融机构时时爆雷。在这一布景下，金融监管聚积化的必要性突显，“加强党中央对金融使命的聚积长入相似”反应了中国强化金融监管和改善金融风险管理的努力。

尽管可能激励影响效劳的担忧，但“聚积长入相似”是中国在波动加大的国表里环境中竭力于移动金融表示的一种求实策略。中国区域发展叛逆衡，漫长的边境线上民族和酬酢关系复杂，使得在移动社会和经济表示发展问题上，中央的长入和谐相配关键。中国数千年历史也标明，社会表示是中国经济发展的关键条款之一，而由于中国金融业特有的政事性特征，金融表示与社会表示又密不成分。

连年来，跟着国内经济压力高潮和地缘政事风险升级，金融表示变得至关要紧。金融治理结构的颓势，金融体系的谈德风险和风险管理不善，对中国的金融表示组成了最为热切的胁迫，亟需通过“聚积长入相似”尽快“止血”。

“聚积长入相似”对金融风险能干息争决才智的补助在检阅效劳中占据主导地位。固然聚积化可能在一定程度上会拉长监管链条，减弱金融机构的天真性和效劳，但其主要见地是幸免监督踱步和监管盲点，确保各级政府之间更灵验的和谐，加强对场所当局和金融实体的监督。至关要紧的是，并无显着字据表露中国政府强化了对个体金融机构信贷投向和想到打算有谋略的搅扰。在连年的本质环境下，其更为主要的效应在于对金融监管层和金融机构管理层谈德风险的缓释，及对金融风险预先防控和过后解决才智的补助作用。

在这一层面，“聚积长入相似”在搪塞中国金融体系靠近的最热切挑战方面已被评释注解是灵验的。中国金融监管层发布的数据表露，2023年寰球高风险机构数目有所下跌，2017年以来影子银行风险也显贵管理，场所政府债的风险解决也在中央统筹下有序鼓励，金融风险呈现总体可控趋势。固然行业合座财务数据表露，连年看金融机构盈利才智从容下行，但其中更多源自国表里宏不雅大环境的影响。

更为要紧的是要意识到，“聚积长入相似”是杀青标的的一种本事，而非终极标的，也并不代表中国金融治理的根蒂滚动，而是朝着更可控、更高效的监管体系迈出的关键一步。最终标的不是肤浅的聚积权利，而是开拓一个更具凝合力的框架，以恰当进一步有序的权利下放。在此基础上，金融监管机构一直在通过加强央地和谐来鼓励均权检阅，检阅还波及优化和简化两个层面的组织框架。跟着国表里经济政事环境日益复杂，中国必将以一种恰当其特等政事经济布景的形貌恬逸不懈地深化金融检阅。

以下为著述英文版

China’s move to centralise oversight of

financial sector shouldn’t be feared

In 2017, at its highest-level financial work conference, China stressed the need for the country’s financial affairs to be under centralised and unified party leadership. This was reaffirmed at the five-yearly conference last year, which spoke of strengthening party leadership over the financial sector.

Since last year, China’s evolving financial regulatory reform has sparked widespread debate in the international media. Critics warn that heightened centralisation and political oversight could, through interventions in capital and credit allocation, exacerbate financial instability.

They argue that uniform adherence to centrally approved guidelines could lead to synchronised market behaviour, amplifying procyclical risks and inflating asset bubbles. Others contend that China’s reforms represent a fundamental reorientation of its financial system, with a focus on financial institutions as utilities rather than as market-driven entities.

But these critiques often fall short of fully capturing the complexity and broader context of China’s regulatory approach.

China’s approach of “centralised and unified leadership” is deeply rooted in its governance structure, which blends political centralisation with partial fiscal decentralisation. This arrangement, often described as a “quasi-fiscal federalism”, grants local governments much autonomy in economic decision-making, but without formal bankruptcy mechanisms. Many local financial institutions maintain close ties with local governments, adding complexity to the financial landscape.

Beijing has worked to recalibrate the balance of power between central and local governments and to mitigate implicit guarantees that distort market behaviour. Yet, given China’s size and the growing complexity of domestic and international environments, these reforms necessarily proceed gradually.

At the heart of this governance model is the asymmetry in risk-sharing. In a sound corporate governance system, shareholders bear the primary risks and receive matching returns. In China, however, the central government is the de facto guarantor of financial stability.

The asymmetry leaves local governments and financial institutions with insufficient incentives to prudently manage financial risks. This is the political distinctiveness of China’s financial system.

The principle of aligning responsibilities and rights lies at the core of China’s financial reform agenda. Since China began reforms and opening up, much progress has been made in financial regulation, risk management and technological innovation.

The past two decades of financial reforms have largely been modelled on Western economies but adapted to domestic realities. While China tried to balance marketisation with regulatory oversight, the regulatory framework has still revealed critical governance and regulatory gaps, especially in small and medium-sized institutions, compounded by regulatory blind spots and the failure of local governments to enforce fiscal discipline.

The corruption cases, escalation in local debt and risk exposure from small financial institutions underscore the need for a more centralised regulatory framework. The emphasis on centralised and unified leadership is thus a response to these systemic challenges, and a reflection of China’s efforts to strengthen financial oversight and risk management.

Despite inefficiency concerns, China’s emphasis on centralised leadership reflects a pragmatic strategy to maintain financial stability in a volatile environment. The country’s uneven regional development and complex ethnic and diplomatic relations, particularly along its extensive borders, make central coordination critical.

History has shown that stability is a critical condition of China’s economic progress, with financial stability inextricably linked to social stability due to its political nature.

As China grapples with rising domestic economic pressures and escalating international risks in recent years, financial stability has become paramount. While fiscal decentralisation has fuelled local-level economic dynamism in past decades, it has also contributed to moral hazard and risk mismanagement, pressing threats to China’s financial stability.

The absence of a formal bankruptcy mechanism, combined with the entanglement of local governments and financial institutions, has created a precarious system, making centralised and unified leadership necessary to staunch the bleeding.

The enhancement of financial risk prevention and resolution capabilities is a major effect of the reform. While centralisation may stretch the regulatory chain and undermine the flexibility and efficiency of financial institutions, it is aimed primarily at avoiding fragmented oversight and regulatory blind spots, ensuring more effective collaboration across various levels of government, and strengthening the oversight of local authorities and financial entities.

Crucially, there is no significant evidence the central government has intensified direct intervention in the operational decisions of financial institutions. Even though it may amplify procyclical risk and reduce operational efficiency, its primary effect is to mitigate moral hazard at the regulatory and managerial levels, while managing systemic risks.

In this regard, the central leadership has proved effective in addressing the most pressing challenges facing China’s financial system. Regulatory data shows a marked reduction in high-risk institutions last year, a notable decline in shadow banking risks since 2017, and progress in local government debt resolution – all signs of a more controlled risk landscape.

While recent industry-wide financial data suggests a gradual decline in the operational efficiency of financial institutions, this is largely a reflection of broader macroeconomic conditions, domestic and global.

It is important to recognise that centralised and unified leadership is a means to an end. It does not represent a fundamental shift in China’s financial governance but a crucial step towards a more controlled and efficient regulatory system.

The ultimate goal is not to centralise power but to establish a more cohesive framework to accommodate further orderly decentralisation. On this basis, financial regulators have been advancing the decentralisation reform through enhancing central-local collaboration. The reforms also involve optimising and streamlining the organisational framework at both levels.

As China navigates an increasingly complex global landscape, its financial reforms are expected to evolve in a manner that aligns with its unique political and economic context.